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Abstract: The theft of personal information to fake the identity of a person is a common threat normally performed by individual
criminals, terrorists, or crime rings to commit fraud or other felonies. Recently, the Spanish identity card, which provides enough
information to hire on-line products such as mortgages or loans, was updated to incorporate a Near Field Communication (NFC)
chip as electronic passports do. This contactless interface brings a new attack vector for criminals, who might take advantage of
the RFID communication to virtually steal personal information. In this paper, we consider as case study the recently deployed
contactless Spanish identity card assessing its security against identity theft. In particular, we evaluated the security of one of the
contactless access protocol as implemented in the contactless Spanish identity card, and found that no defenses against on-line
brute-force attacks were incorporated. We then suggest two countermeasures to protect against these attacks. Furthermore, we
also analyzed the pseudo-random number generator within the card, which passed all the performed tests with good results.
1 Introduction
Identity theft is defined as the theft of personal information, such
as name, date of birth, etc. – that is, any data that allows a party to
fake the identity of another party [1]. Each country defines different
laws that protect their citizens from this kind of theft. For instance,
the Spanish law punishes the use of personal information to fake the
identity of an individual and perform actions on its behalf with up to
three years of prison [2].
In Spain, this personal information is collected in the Spanish
identification (ID) card, abbreviated as DNI (Documento Nacional
de Identidad, in Spanish), which is issued to any Spanish citizen.
Data contained on this card are, among others, the first name, the
family names, the unique identification number of the citizen, and
the birth date.
An identity theft is normally performed by an individual criminal,
a terrorist, or a crime ring, who will take advantage of the identity
to commit fraud or other felonies [3]. In Spain, data written on the
DNI are enough to hire different on-line products (such as telecom-
munication services, mortgages, or loans). Some reports quantified a
total of 4.5 million of these cases in Spain, with an average fraud of
8000e per case [4].
Examples of felonies performed by criminals after the theft of
Spanish ID cards are reported in [5]. For instance, during 2010 a
Spanish male citizen repetitively stole DNIs from gym lockers to
later obtain personal information (such as tax information) and then
ask for credit cards and loans on behalf of victims. The DNI of a
female citizen was stolen in Madrid subway, and then used by a
convenience marriage mafia. Another Spanish male citizen went to
Italian jail for 626 days after he sold his DNI, which was later used to
check-in in Italian hotels by a Neapolitan mafia-related drug dealer.
Recently, the DNI was updated to incorporate a Near Field Com-
munication (NFC) chip, as electronic passports (e-passports, for
short) do [6]. NFC is a bidirectional short-range (up to 10 cm)
contactless communication technology operating in the 13.56 MHz
band based on the ISO-14443 [7] and the Sony FeLiCa [8] Radio
Frequency Identification (RFID) standards. NFC is vulnerable to
multiple threats such as eavesdropping, data modification (i.e., alter-
ation, insertion, or destruction), or relay attacks [9–11]. NFC is
emerging in a wide range of applications, from ticketing, staff iden-
tification, or physical access control, to cashless payment, to name a
few. Following this trend, to date, almost 300 different NFC-enabled
phones are (or will be soon) available at the market [12]. Hence,
the eruption of NFC-enabled phones (or devices) may bring crimi-
nals a new attack vector to these NFC-enabled ID cards, as DNI or
e-passports.
In this paper, we performed an independent security assessment
of the NFC-enabled DNI. In particular, we evaluated the possibil-
ity of stealing personal information from a Spanish citizen without
his/her knowledge using NFC capabilities. Our experiments showed
that, in general, the protocols used to communicate via contactless
with a DNI are secure enough and well coded. However, we dis-
covered that the DNI did not incorporate any mechanism to prevent
(on-line) brute-force attacks. We also proposed a defense mech-
anism. Our findings were communicated to the Spanish National
agency in charge of the Spanish ID card development, who acknowl-
edged us by taking our defense proposal into consideration for future
revisions.
Let us remark that we are not providing here new vulnerabili-
ties of or attacks to contactless protocols, as in [13–17]. This paper
presents the results of an independent security assessment of the
implementation of the NFC-enabled DNI as a case study. Our goal is
to verify whether such implementation is performing as expected, in
terms of security, since strongly sensitive data depend on it. While
some functionalities of the new card have been certified, the pro-
tocols we test have not, to our knowledge, undergone a formal
certification for the concrete hardware and software combination in
the Spanish DNI3.0 card. Some other functionalities related to digi-
tal signatures have passed an EAL4+ (AVA_VAN.5) level Common
Criteria security evaluation [18] and a previous implementation of
the PACE protocol which uses the same chip the NFC DNI card
has also passed an EAL4+ evaluation, but for the software in Ger-
man electronic travel documents [19]. These certifications suggest
random number generation and the access protocols are correctly
implemented, but the NFC-enabled DNI as a whole has not been
yet certified. In this case study we cover some of the untested parts
and give an independent evaluation of the session establishment
protocols in the NFC implementation of the DNI.
Related Work: Most previous existing works on the topic of NFC
documents focus on electronic passports (e-passports). In [13],
general NFC security threats as skimming or eavesdropping were
remarked. Security and privacy issues of the European e-passport
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threats were largely detailed in [14]. Similarly, the risks of adding
RFID to the US e-passports were reported in [20].
A good review on security features among e-passports of differ-
ent countries was given in [15]. An FPGA implementation to crack
BAC keys (mainly for German and Netherlands e-passports) was
introduced in [21]. This implementation, termed as COPACOBANA,
achieved a key search speed of 228 BAC keys per second. In [17],
the authors proved that it was possible to fingerprint e-passports
from different countries. As stated by the authors, fingerprinting e-
passports opens the window to the possibility of passport bomb,
designed to explode when someone with a e-passport of a certain
nationality comes close enough.
Regarding security assessment of e-passports, it is worth men-
tioning [22], where the authors identified security weaknesses in the
Australian e-passport implementation using model-checking tech-
niques. The low entropy problem in the password-derived key used
by BAC was already pointed out in [16], where the authors also intro-
duced the PACE protocol as a way to overcome the BAC protocol
weaknesses.
To the best of our knowledge, we were the first to assess the
security of the Spanish contactless ID card outside the official certifi-
cation process. Other works, such as [23], evaluate the security of the
German electronic contactless ID card, which shares many elements
with the Spanish implementation.
Outline: This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 gives some
background, in particular regarding the Spanish ID card and the
ISO/IEC 14443 standard. Section 3 introduces the protocols used to
communicate with the NFC-enabled DNI (namely, the Basic Access
Control and the Password Authenticated Connection Establishment
protocols). Security assessment is detailed in Section 4. Finally,
Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 Background
In this section, we first review the evolution of Spanish ID card.
Then, we briefly introduce the ISO/IEC 14443 standard [7] in which
the latest version of electronic Spanish ID card relies on.
2.1 Spanish Identity Card
The first Spanish ID card dates back to the first years after the
Spanish Civil War, in 1941. On those dates, it was issued by local
governments. Ten years later and after a national decree, the first
DNI was issued to the Spanish general and dictator Francisco Franco
Bahamonde. These ID cards where issued first to persons on pro-
bation and prisoners, then to frequent male travelers (due to their
business or profession), and later to male population residing in
cities with more than 100000 inhabitants. After that, it was issued
to male population residing in cities within 25000 and 10000 inhab-
itants and then to frequent female travelers, and so on and so forth
until reaching the whole of society.
In the following years, several revisions of the DNI were pro-
posed, sometimes adding or removing personal data (civil status,
blood type, and economic status were present during first versions,
later removed). The first electronic DNI, named DNIe2.0, was issued
in 2006. It incorporated an electronic chip and several physical secu-
rity elements to prevent card forging. The electronic chip was a
32K STMicroelectronics ST19WL34. According to official docu-
ments [24], data within the chip were divided into three different
zones: a public zone, which contained the intermediate CA cer-
tificate, Diffie-Hellman keys, and the X.509 certificate (read with
no restrictions); a private zone, which contained the signature and
authentication certificates of the citizen (only accessible through a
PIN); and a security zone, which contained the citizen data (all data
printed also on the front of DNI), facial picture, and the handwritten
signature image (only accessible through special locations).
Recently, in 2015, the electronic DNI was improved by adding
contactless capability into it. This revision was called DNIe3.0. In
particular, it adds a Near Field Communication (NFC) chip. Fur-
thermore, it also adds new physical elements to make forging even
harder. The chip is an Infineon Technologies SLE78CLFx408AP
with 400K of capacity and 8KB of RAM [25]. This chip is pre-
pared to support the access protocols we discuss. In particular, the
implementation of the PACE protocol for German electronic travel
documents CardOS DI V5.3 EAC/PACE Version 1.0 has success-
fully passed the Common Criteria EAL4 certification [19]. It also
supports several cryptographic algorithms, such as RSA (through a
built-in RSA library following the PKCS#1 standard for key gener-
ation), SHA-256 hashing to validate authentication commands and
certificate validation, and 3DES and AES symmetric-key algorithms.
According to official documents [25], in this case data are divided
into two different zones: a public zone, which contains the interme-
diate CA certificate, Diffie-Hellman keys, X.509 certificate, and the
signature and authentication certificates of the citizen (read with no
restrictions); and a security zone, which contains, as before, the citi-
zen data (all data printed also on the front of DNI), facial picture, and
the citizen’s scanned handwritten signature (only accessible through
special locations). All those data are divided into four different data
groups. We comment these data groups in detail in Section 3.3.
2.2 ISO/IEC 14443 Standard
Spanish ID cards rely on the ISO/IEC 14443 standard [7] to com-
municate through NFC. ISO/IEC 14443 is a four-part international
standard for contactless smartcards operating at 13.56 MHz [7].
The NFC cards, also termed as Proximity Integrated Circuit Cards
(PICC) or tags, are intended to operate up to 10 cm of a reader
antenna, usually termed as Proximity Coupling Device (PCD).
ISO-14443-1 standard defines the size, physical characteristics,
and environmental working card conditions. Part 2 of the standard
defines the RF power and signaling schemes. In particular, two sig-
naling schemes are defined (Type A and Type B). Both schemes are
half duplex with a data rate of 106 kbps (in each direction). DNIe3.0
follows the Type-B signaling scheme. ISO-14443-3 describes initial-
ization and anti-collision protocols, as well as commands, responses,
data frame, and timing issues. Part 4 defines the high-level data trans-
mission protocols. A PICC fulfilling all parts of ISO/IEC 14443
is named IsoDep card (for instance, contactless payment cards).
Apart from specific protocol commands, the protocol defined in Part
4 is also capable of transferring Application Protocol Data Units
(APDUs) as defined in ISO/IEC 7816-4 [26] and of application
selection as defined in ISO/IEC 7816-5 [27]. In particular, DNIe3.0
uses T = 0 ISO/IEC 7816 and T = CL ISO-14443 as transmission
protocols.
3 Contactless Protocols used by DNIe3.0
This section briefly summarizes the protocols used by DNIe3.0
to communicate through the NFC interface. In particular, we first
describe the Basic Access Control protocol and then the Password
Authenticated Connection Establishment protocol. Both protocols
are also used in electronic passports [16]. Furthermore, we also ana-
lyze here the entropy of their key space. Lastly, we describe the
personal data which are transmitted via the contactless interface.
3.1 Basic Access Control Protocol
The Basic Access Control (BAC) protocol is included in Document
9303 [28], promoted by the International Civil Aviation Organiza-
tion (ICAO), as a control mechanism to access to data stored in a
secure chip through an RFID interface.
BAC was designed to protect less sensitive data and, in particu-
lar, to defend against skimming and eavesdropping threats [16]. To
do so, it uses symmetric key device authentication. After a success-
ful mutual authentication, the parties (reader and card) agree on a
session key used to encrypt the subsequent exchange of informa-
tion. The protocol uses as initial key some parts of the Machine
Readable Zone (MRZ), located at the bottom of the reverse side
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Fig. 1: (a) Front side and (b) reverse side of the Spanish contactless ID card (extracted from [25]).
of the DNIe3.0, which serves to verify physical access to the doc-
ument. The necessary fields are, namely, the serial number of the
identity card, date of birth, and expiry date (both dates expressed in
a “yymmdd” format).
The strength of the key used to encrypt and authenticate the con-
tactless communication is directly proportional to the strength of
the MRZ-derived password, due to the use of symmetric cryptogra-
phy. The level of protection depends on the ignorance of the attacker
about the information on the MRZ. Therefore, even though the pass-
word is derived in a deterministic way, we can compute an entropy
value that estimates how many bits an attacker needs to guess in a
brute-force attack. This value measures the uncertainty in the data
the attacker possesses. Considering only the fields used in DNIe3.0,
the maximum entropy of the MRZ can be estimated as follows:
• Serial number: this field is composed of 3 alphabetic charac-
ters plus 6 digits. Assuming random characters and digits, this
corresponds to log2(26
3 · 106) = 34.0329 bits.
• Date of birth: assuming a maximum age of 100, this corre-
sponds to log2(101 · 365.25) = 15.171 bits. Open-source intelli-
gence (OSINT) techniques may reduce this value up to zero.
• Expiry date: the DNIe3.0 can have different expiry dates from the
date of issue, depending on the age of the individual [29]. Namely,
the expiry date is 2 years for children under 5, 5 years from the issue
date when the age is greater than 5 and lower than 30 years, or 10
years otherwise. There is no expiry date when the age of the individ-
ual is greater than 70 years. Assuming a validity period of 10 years,
this corresponds to log2(10 · 365.25) = 11.8347 bits. We use this
ballpark estimate as our working hypothesis, but the model can be
refined (for instance, considering only working days).
Hence, at best, the strength of the key used by BAC is
about 61 bits, which is less than the 80 bits recommended
by both NIST and ECRYPT to protect against eavesdropping
and other offline attacks [30, 31]. This estimate can be refined.
For instance, the date of birth determines the range in the
expiry date. When we consider both parameters together, we see
their entropy is log2(2 · 5 · 365.252 + 5 · 25 · 365.252 + 10 · 40 ·
365.252 + 31 · 365.25) = 26.089, which is roughly 1 bit less than
the broad average. We can also take into account that the issue day
must be a working day, which limits the possible expiry dates. DNI
issuing offices close on Sundays and many of them on Saturdays (or
they offer only morning hours). If we factor all the local and national
holidays, we get a rough correction factor of 0.75. These refinements
reduce the search space to around 59 or 60 bits. Similarly, the new
DNIe3.0 has only been active from 2015 and the number of possible
issue dates is, at the time of writing, less than 1000 days, which gives
a further reduction of about 1 to 2 bits of uncertainty.
This is a small reduction when compared to attacks based on
open-source intelligence methods. The date of birth of a particular
target can be gathered from public sources or could even be asked
as a registration step in the same smartphone malware disguising as
another application that later carries the attack. With a known birth
date, the unknown bits reduce to a range from 35 bits (for ages over
70 when the expiry date is fixed) to 46 bits for the 10 year expiry
range. Alternatively, the attacker can try an attack in a location close
to the issuing office to target cards that have just been issued and
eliminate the almost 12 bits of uncertainty in the expiry date. The
safest line of defense against open-source intelligence is the random
serial number, which can be enough to thwart a casual attacker. In
the worst case scenario, phone malware could make the phone take
a picture when it detects a nearby card and then read all the data
needed to reproduce the key from the machine readable zone just
a legitimate reader does. This would be equivalent to physical theft
of the card. These advanced attacks are possible but challenging.
Instead, we will consider basic brute-force attacks where no part of
the initial key is known.
3.2 Password Authenticated Connection Establishment
Protocol
The Password Authenticated Connection Establishment (PACE) pro-
tocol was proposed as an alternative to BAC, offering excellent
protection against offline attacks [32]. The PACE protocol uses
a weak password (with low entropy), verifies it, and generates
cryptographically strong session keys.
In particular, the PACE protocol works as follows. First, the chip
randomly chooses a number, encrypts it with a password-derived
key and sends it to the terminal. Second, both the chip and the
terminal map the random number to a specific set of parameters
for asymmetric cryptography. Third, the chip and the terminal per-
form a Diffie-Hellman protocol based on those parameters. Later,
the chip and terminal derive session keys, which are confirmed by
exchanging and checking the authentication tokens.
As a password-derived key, it uses a 6-digit length number termed
as Card Access Number (CAN). As suggested by the PACE protocol
specification [33], CAN may be static (printed in the card), semi-
static (printed on a label on the card) or dynamic (randomly chosen
during each operation and displayed using electronic ink, OLED
or similar technologies). DNIe3.0 uses a static CAN number, i.e.,
printed on the front side of the card. As far as we are aware, this
number is randomly generated by the manufacturing machine that
produces the DNIe3.0 smartcard. We tried to contact the manufac-
turer and the people involved in the project to ask them about how
CAN numbers are generated. However, we have received no positive
answer. Under this security-by-obscurity principle, we assume that
they are generated as secure as possible, i.e., CAN numbers are uni-
formly distributed random numbers in the interval [0, 106). Hence,
the entropy of this key is almost 20 bits (log2 10
6 = 19.9316) in
contrast to the random numbers used after the exchange in the initial
PACE protocol, which give session keys with an entropy of 128 bits.
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3.3 Data Transmitted via the Contactless Interface
The chip of the DNIe3.0 stores data following a standard logical data
structure, as defined in ISO/IEC 7816-4 [26]. In particular, ISO/IEC
7816 supports two different file categories (dedicated files and ele-
mentary files). From these, elementary files are used for storing data,
while dedicated files are used for defining logical structural hier-
archy (they may be seen as subdirectories). Elementary files are
also called data groups. Data contained in such data groups are
both individually and collectively signed by the Spanish govern-
ment (as in e-passports, where data groups are signed by the issuing
government).
There exists four different data groups which are accessible once
the BAC or PAC protocol connection is successful:
Data Group 1.This file contains all data regarding the citizen that
is visible in the front of the DNIe3.0: name and surnames
(represented as a string), nationality (string), gender (string),
support number (unequivocally identifies the location in which
the DNIe3.0 was issued), issuer (string, it contains “España”),
optional data (with null value), and document type (string, it
contains “ID”).
Data Group 2.This file contains the facial image of the identity card
owner, which follows the JPEG 2000 image compression stan-
dard, as defined in ISO/IEC 15444. We have empirically verified
that file image contains no meta-data, thus making harder to an
attacker to figure out information regarding the machine used to
issue DNIe3.0 cards.
Data Group 7.This file contains the handwritten signature image.
As before, this image file follows the ISO/IEC 15444 standard
and has no meta-data associated to it.
Data Group 11.This file contains more personal information
about the card owner. Some of this information contains val-
ues, as the home address (string), the unique number that
unequivocally identifies the citizen for the Spannish govern-
ment (string), and the birth place (string, for instance, value
“ZARAGOZA<ZARAGOZA”). There exists also other fields that
currently contain no data. These fields are, in particular: title,
telephone, occupation, custody info, ICAO name, other info, and
summary. Although these fields may contain data before long,
strong privacy concerns and user dissatisfaction are likely to occur
since some data might be very sensitive.
According to official documentation [25], these data are stored in
a security zone only accessible through special locations. However,
we were able to access the data in the security zone with standard
reading commands from our laboratory, contrary to it was stated in
official documents.
4 Security Assessment
This section introduces our security assessment of the Spanish con-
tactless ID card. Note that the chip within DNIe3.0 will answer to
both BAC and PACE protocol requests. Since the key entropy used
by the PACE protocol is much lower than the key entropy used by the
BAC protocol, we focus on the PACE protocol instead of BAC. Thus,
we first study how DNIe3.0 behaves against a brute-force attack on
the password-derived key used by the PACE protocol.
Recall that to establish a PACE protocol connection, the chip gen-
erates a random number of 128 bits and sends it encrypted with
the CAN to the reader. Therefore, the security of the system also
depends on the properties of the pseudo-random number generator
used. Hence, we also evaluate the degree of randomness within a set
of collected random numbers.



























Fig. 2: Time spent in each PACE protocol connection attempt.
4.1 Brute Forcing Password-derived Keys
We developed an Android app∗ taking AndroSmex† as a code
skeleton to perform the brute force attack. AndroSmex provides a
basic implementation of connection through the PACE protocol with
the German ID card. As our hardware platform, we used a SONY
Xperia Z3 Tablet Compact, which has a 2.5GHz Qualcomm Snap-
dragon 801 MSM8974AC quad-core processor, 3GB RAM memory,
and a Broadcomm NFC chip.
We first measured how long it took to perform 500 PACE protocol
connection attempts. Figure 2 plots the time spent in each attempt.
Our findings show that every PACE protocol connection took, on
average, 1.4509 seconds, regardless of the password-derived key
used. This time was (roughly) divided as follows: 200 ms to generate
and operate with random numbers, 1200 ms to perform the Diffie-
Hellman protocol, and 100 ms to generate, exchange, and check the
authentication tokens.
These timing results show that even when the password-derived
key used is incorrect, the implementation of the PACE protocol con-
tinues execution until the last step, in which the authentication tokens
do not match and the connection is closed. Thus, the PACE proto-
col as implemented in the DNIe3.0 does not exfiltrate whether the
password-derived key used is correct until the protocol ends. This is
technically correct and desired, since no clue is given to a brute-force
attacker.
However, these results also evidence that there exists no defense
implemented against on-line brute-force attacks. Regardless of the
number of connection attempts, the execution time of the PACE pro-
tocol remains the same. Hence, supposing a compromised Android
smartphone with NFC capabilities and assuming a DNIe3.0 contin-
uously in NFC range, in the worst case personal data could be stolen
in near to 17 days.
This scenario is unlikely, since, of course, to communicate with a
NFC card during 17 days without any interruption (and without any
notice from the owner) is almost impossible. Nonetheless, targeted
attacks may occur to specific individuals of interest. Furthermore,
these attacks might be more feasible if DNIe3.0 fingerprinting is
available and the attacker can stop and resume the brute-force attack
whenever the card is at reach. We aim to further investigate this issue
as future work.
Once this attack is successful, different attacks are likely to occur.
For instance, a malicious app could use the new credentials and,
after authentication, try to sign certificates of the owner of the card.
To do so, the card would ask for the PIN. After three consecutive
incorrect PIN, the card would be blocked. Hence, the user shall go
to special locations (where the DNIe3.0 was issued) to unblock it
before being able to legitimately use it. This attack can be classified
as a Denial-of-Service. Of course, in case that a malicious app could
∗Source code is released under GPLv3 license and available at https:
//github.com/ricardojrdez/DNIe3.0_brute_force_v2.
†Source code available at https://github.com/tsenger/
androsmex.
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impersonate some legitimate app and could also know the PIN, other
attacks are likely to occur, such as relay attacks: the attacker might
use the authentication and sign certificates of the user remotely to
perform an on-line identity theft.
Suggested improvements: We suggest two different countermea-
sures to defend against on-line brute-force attacks in PACE protocol.
We first describe a countermeasure focused at software level and
then another one focused at hardware level.
We envision that the revised PACE protocol may take different
times to complete, depending on sequential connection attempts.
French and Belgian electronic passports, for instance, already use
this defense mechanism [6], in which a maximum number of con-
secutive attempts is defined and the response time depends on the
connection attempt number. When the maximum is reached, the
response time is set to a given value much greater than the normal
operation time of the protocol. Hence, it makes infeasible an on-line
brute-force attack when the maximum is reached.
Algorithm 1: Pseudo-code of our software proposal against on-line
brute-force attacks.
/* inside the function executed when the
smartcard is powered */
1 . . .
2 Initialize consecutive connections to zero
3 Initialize last connection to zero
4 . . .
/* called for each connection attempt */
5 Procedure attempt_PACE_connection(δ)
Input: δ ∈ R>0 defines the threshold used to detect
consecutive connection attempts.
6 Store current timestamp in current timestamp variable (in
milliseconds precision)
7 if (|last connection− current timestamp| ≤ δ) then
8 Reset NFC connection
9 Increment consecutive connections value
10 Sleep processor for consecutive connections seconds
11 Start NFC connection
12 end
13 Establish a new PACE connection
14 Set last connection value to current timestamp
15 end
The pseudo-code for our software proposal is shown in
Algorithm 1. Lines 2, 3 are intended to be included in the proce-
dure executed when the smartcard is powered on. They are devoted
to initialize the values of the counter of consecutive connections and
the timestamp of the last connection performed. Then, the proce-
dure attempt_PACE_connection (lines 5–15) is added and executed
for each connection attempt. This procedure receives a δ ∈ R>0,
used as threshold to detect (fast) consecutive attempts, in terms of
milliseconds. The first line of the procedure gets the current time
stamp, in milliseconds. Then, when the difference between last con-
nection and current timestamps is lower than or equal to that δ, lines
8–11 take place: first, the NFC connection is reset; then, the consec-
utive connection counter is increased and the smartcard’s processor
is put to sleep for as many seconds as the value of the counter; last,
the NFC connection is restarted. Finally, line 13 executes the PACE
protocol and line 14 stores the current time under the name “last
connection”, which will be checked in the next connection attempt
to keep track of previous requests.
Figure 3 plots both the execution time of PACE protocol as giving
by Algorithm 1 (solid line) and as given by previous experimenta-
tion (dashed line) for an excerpt of 100 connection attempts. For the
sake of simplicity, we only considered the execution time of line 10
of Algorithm 1. As observed, this little improvement would make
infeasible an on-line brute-force attack against the DNIe3.0.

























Fig. 3: Comparison between execution time with (solid line) and
without defense (dashed line) against brute-force attacks.
The above software solution can be implemented almost immedi-
ately with little effort and minimal impact in the rest of the system.
This notwithstanding, there are also simple design solutions that
can be incorporated into newer cards to protect against brute-force
attacks.
We suggest a second countermeasure where multiple connection
attempts are hampered by controlling the power coupling between
the reader and the card. In particular, the card will react to mul-
tiple connection attempts by reducing the signal available to the
reader, thus forcing the attacker to come closer to the card. Imposing
shorter distances makes automated attacks harder and makes also the
attacker more conspicuous.
On the other hand, a legitimate reader trying to communicate with
the card would have little additional troubles. If a rightful reader fails
multiple connection attempts, the card is likely to be too far away for
correct communication. Reducing the power would cut the connec-
tion and force the card owner to place it closer to the reader, the usual
response when a contactless reader is not working. Reducing the sig-
nal is not a big problem in supervised communication, where the user
must place the card in the reader. The need for user involvement is,
in fact, one of the purposes of using near fields.
The suggested power reduction can be implemented with a small
modification to the current hardware. The DNIe3.0 card, like many
NFC cards and tokens, is passive, i.e. it does not have a power
source of its own and communication with readers is done using
load modulation. The coils in the card and the reader exchange infor-
mation through inductive coupling. The reader can supply power
to its coil, but the card cannot. As defined in the ISO/IEC 14443-
2 standard [34], the reader sends data to the card by modulating
the amplitude of the coupled RF field at the source, controlling the
power supplied to the antenna. The communication from the card
to the reader is done by altering the load connected to the card’s
antenna. The card can use a transistor to connect and disconnect a
resistor to the antenna circuit. This load at the antenna modifies the
radio-frequency coupling. The card can increase the load and absorb
a larger part of the shared energy, which reduces the amplitude in
the signals the reader measures. The fluctuations in the load are then
used to encode data.
The basic load modulation circuit can be modified to prevent
brute-force attacks. With minimal modifications, we can add a sec-
ond load that can also be selectively added or not. If the card detects
multiple connection attempts, it can connect the additional load (the
dampening load). The available power in the field would decrease,
but load modulation is still possible. Choosing right load values, the
reduced power level when the dampening load is connected would
further decrease when the modulation load is also part of the cir-
cuit. The result is a new load modulated signal at smaller amplitude
levels.
The time and distance constraints of the proposed countermea-
sures make brute-force attacks more difficult without appreciable
impact on the legitimate user. Both countermeasures can be com-
bined for a greater effect and they do not restrict to the DNIe3.0 card,
but can be extended to many other NFC and RFID secure protocols.
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We communicated our findings to the National Coinage and
Stamp Factory – Royal Mint, the Spanish National agency in charge
of the development of the electronic Spanish ID card. They acknowl-
edged our suggestions and told us to be taken into consideration for
future DNIe3.0 implementation revisions.
4.2 Randomness analysis of the nonces used by PACE
The PACE authentication protocol includes single-use bit sequences,
or nonces, in order to make each communication step unique.
Nonces help, among other things, to prevent replay and offline
attacks. Predictable random sequences can significantly weaken
authentication protocols as evinced by the attacks to the WEP wire-
less security protocol that compromise the security of a Wi-Fi
connection by predicting its initialization vector [35, 36].
In this section, we analyze the random nonces generated by the
DNIe3.0 during the PACE protocol. As previously described in
Section 2.1, the DNIe3.0 includes Infineon’s SLE78CLFX408AP
chip [25], which is used in a similar context in the German elec-
tronic passport, where its use of the PACE protocol was certified to
be in accordance with the Common Methodology for IT Security
evaluation at level EAL4+ [19, 37].
In this part of the study, we are concerned with the pseudo-random
number generator in the card, which satisfies the requirements to be
considered as a class PTG.2 chip according to the BSI (Bundesamt
für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik) recommendation AIS 31
for physical random number generators [38]. This means the chip
should include a physical source of entropy that is later fed into a
software random number generator. The output is then processed and
checked for errors and statistical deviations from randomness.
Although these certifications suggests the card can handle the
PACE connection properly and produce good random numbers, as
far as we know there has been no public formal evaluation of the
chip/software combination as used in the NFC version of the DNI.
Additionally, while a good certification procedure is essential, there
have been examples of certified electronic ID cards with weak ran-
dom number generators. For instance, the Taiwan ID card had a
good random number generation procedure, but some cards did not
enforce it and, as a result, there was a series of cards with weak
keys [39]. For that reason, it is worth making additional evaluations
to discover problems early on.
In order to give an independent test of the random number gen-
erator used by the card during the PACE protocol, we collected
the nonces from a series of failed PACE connection attempts. For
each connection request, the card answers with a new challenge that
includes a random number. Using the known CAN number from the
card, we were able to decode these random nonces and abort the con-
nection by sending a malformed message. In total, we collected 105
nonces of 16 bytes each.
We analyzed these nonces to assess their randomness and found
them to be robust against the most common tests. In the following,
we briefly describe these tests.
As a preliminary test, we checked there was no repeated nonce in
the 105 captured values as expected. Each nonce has 16 bytes and a
loose birthday paradox estimation gives us an expected probability
of collision of the order of 10−3 for our long capture time.
Checking the resulting sequences for randomness is more tricky.
There is no way to determine whether a finite sequence has been pro-
duced randomly or not. The bits 00 are no more or less random than
10. There are, however, multiple statistical tests that can estimate
how likely it is that our bit sequence comes from a uniform random
process [40].
From the possible testing options, we chose a few methods com-
patible with our (relatively short) collection of random bits. First, we
used the utility ent [41] on the binary nonces with a result:
$ ent nonces.bin
Entropy = 7.999894 bits per byte.
Optimum compression would reduce the size
of this 1600000 byte file by 0 percent.
Chi square distribution for 1600000 samples is 234.59, and
randomly
would exceed this value 75.00 percent of the times.
...
The entropy per byte is almost 8 and there is no appreciable size
reduction with compression, which is consistent with a random out-
put. A more sensitive test is Pearson’s χ2 test, which checks for
deviations from the expected statistics of a uniform distribution [42].
These results are as well within the expected values for a random
sequence.
We also submitted the collected nonces to the FIPS 140-2 ran-
domness tests [43] as implemented in the utility rngtest from
rng-tools [44]. The program tested blocks of 20000 bits and all
the tests were passed (see below).
$ cat nonces.bin | rngtest
rngtest 4
Copyright (c) 2004 by Henrique de Moraes Holschuh
This is free software; see the source for copying
conditions. There is NO
warranty; not even for MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A
PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
rngtest: starting FIPS tests...
rngtest: entropy source drained
rngtest: bits received from input: 12800000
rngtest: FIPS 140-2 successes: 639
rngtest: FIPS 140-2 failures: 0
...
rngtest: Program run time: 240792 microseconds
The FIPS tests check for the expected probability of sequences
of consecutive zeros and ones of different lengths (runs) and the
frequency of fixed-size bit combinations, among others, and are
designed to detect failures of a device while in operation. Our
collected nonces pass the tests with success.
We also tried a more visual test, the delayed-coordinates
method [45], previously used to test the random nonces in the
PACE protocol as implemented in the German ID card [23], which
indeed shares many details with the Spanish ID card. In the delayed
coordinates method, we take each nonce together with its three pre-
decessors and map them into a three-dimensional phase space to look
for attractors in the dynamics of the random number generator. Let
n(i) be the ith nonce. We can convert it to a 128 bit positive integer
and define three coordinates as:
x(i) = n(i)− n(i− 1),
y(i) = n(i− 1)− n(i− 2),
z(i) = n(i− 2)− n(i− 3).
(1)
These coordinates define a series of points in the phase space. When
the nonces that are generated around the same time are correlated,
we expect the points in the phase space to cluster in some attractor.
Figures 4 and 5 show the result of our experiment (the 3D graph
and the projections to each bidimensional plane, respectively). The
point distribution in the phase space is consistent with a uniform
random number generator. While this test will not necessarily show
long term correlations, when we consider it together with the previ-
ous results, it increases our confidence that the nonces in the protocol
are indeed random.
Finally, we tested the nonces with the NIST Statistical Test
Suite [46], also with good results. The limited size of our data has
prevented us to perform certain additional tests. For instance, in
the NIST suite, we could not get a significant result for Maurer’s
universal test [47].
To conclude, while no finite amount of testing can discard hid-
den correlations, nonce generation in the chip seems to be free from
obvious defects.
As final experiment, we also tested the behavior of the DNIe3.0
just after power-up. The NFC chip gets its power from the signal
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Fig. 4: Delayed coordinates graph. Each coordinate is defined from
the nonces following Eq. (1). The points cover the phase space as
expected for a random distribution.
of the reading device and the card must initialize its entropy pool
every time it becomes active. With this test we want to check prob-
lems during the initialization phase. On certain occasions, random
number generators can reset to a default state or start before gather-
ing enough entropy and produce predictable outputs. For instance, a
faulty initialization in the electronic keno machine at the Montreal
casino made the numbers repeat on power-up and an observant gam-
bler took advantage of the failure to make more than half a million
dollars [48]. To avoid these problems, the security requirements for
cryptographic modules in FIPS 140-2 include a power-up test [43].
To test the nonces on initialization, we repeated the collection pro-
cedure with a failed PACE request but, this time, we made just one
request before turning the communication off and leaving the card
without any power. The collection procedure is much slower and
thus, we only captured a total of 450 nonces where we found no
repeated values. The results from ent and the FIPS tests are still
consistent with a random sequence. While there is a limited amount
of data due to the large waiting time, the initialization procedure
looks adequate.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we have evaluated the security of the PACE protocol as
implemented in the Spanish contactless ID card (DNIe3.0) as a case
study. The protocol uses an initial common key (the Card Access
Number, CAN) to encrypt a single-use bit sequence (nonce) gener-
ated by the card, later used to derive a secret Diffie-Hellman key that
is used in the communication between the parties. We tested the pro-
tocol against brute-force attacks for an attacker that tries to guess the
CAN and evaluated the randomness of the nonces the card generates.
A brute force attack seems unlikely, since for the measured exe-
cution times and the entropy of the CAN, an attacker would need
to be in close proximity to the card for around 17 days. However,
we found out the current implementation has no defense mechanism
to hamper repeated failed requests. We suggest two different coun-
termeasures. First, we propose to introduce a software method that
detects consecutive connection attempts and when detected, delays
the connection with the smartcard. Second, we propose to reduce the
signal power from the card to the reader when an attack is detected.
Both modifications make any brute force attack even less likely and
almost infeasible. These methods can be used alone or they can be
combined with other previously published methods, such as intro-
ducing a delay after a few connection attempts[6]. We commented
these improvements to the organism responsible for the implementa-
tion of the DNIe3.0, which confirmed that they would be considered
in future versions.
We have also checked the randomness of the nonces the card
generated during the protocol. The times involved in the protocol
make it difficult to collect large sequences for exhaustive random-
ness tests, but the relatively short samples we captured seem to be
free from obvious correlations. The collected sequences were sub-
mitted to different randomness test, including an entropy assessment,
the FIPS140-2 battery, and a delayed coordinates test. All these tests
were successfully passed. Finally, we tested the behavior of the card
at power-up. The random number generator seems to produce robust
sequences from the first moment and we have found no deviation
from the behavior of the card in continuous operation.
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